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Abstract 
In this paper we give an exploratory empirical analysis of the relationship between holdouts and wage bargaining 
in The Netherlands. Holdouts, the negotiation periods between expiration of an old contract and the signing of a 
new contract, appear to have a negative ffect on the negotiated wage increase. 
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1. Introduction 
While most of the empirical literature on industrial disputes is about strikes, delays in wage 
bargaining have been largely neglected. Often, agreements cannot be struck before existing 
contracts expire. The wage negotiation period between the expiration of the old contract and 
the signing of a new contract is called a 'holdout'. During a holdout the terms of the old 
contract apply. 
The economic ontent of a holdout is not clear and not much research as been done in this 
area. Cramton and Tracy (1992) present a theoretical model in which holdouts are used by 
unions to obtain information from firms at lower costs than strikes. Holden (1994) presents a
theoretical analysis of the effects of holdouts and nominal wage rigidity. We are not aware of 
an empirical analysis of holdouts. 
Our paper contributes to the scarce literature on holdouts, focusing on the economic 
content of a holdout in The Netherlands. In our empirical analysis we investigate whether or 
not holdouts have an effeci: ~ on wage bargaining. We analyse the relationship between holdouts 
and outcomes of wage negotiations using a unique panel dataset on 150 settlements of firms 
and industries for the period 1975-1987 which we derived from administrative files of the 
Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. 
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2. Industrial relations in the Dutch labour market 
The Netherlands experience an annual wage bargaining cycle. In September the government 
presents its budget and its macroeconomic forecasts to Parliament. Taking this into account, 
the managements of union and employers' federations consult heir associated trade unions 
and employer associations on the common policy for the national negotiations. Union 
federations participate in national consultative bodies and support the trade unions in 
coordination of the wage bargaining process. Actual wage bargaining starts in the new 
calendar year and is the responsibility of the trade unions, which are organised by industry. In 
the 1980s about 200 industry contracts regulated wages for approximately 80% of the workers 
under collective contracts. The employment terms for the remaining 20% of the workers were 
covered in 600 firm contracts since most larger firms (multinationals) have their own collective 
agreements. 
In The Netherlands collective bargaining covers the employment terms of 70-80% of the 
labour force in the private sector. Employer coverage approximates some 90% of all firms. 
These figures indicate that collective bargaining has a large impact on wage formation. There 
do not appear to be many serious conflicts between employers and unions. Strike activity in 
The Netherlands i  low compared with other European countries. In the 1980s, for example, 
1.4 working days per 100 workers were lost due to strikes, whereas this was 3.5, 12.5 and 37.8 
for Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively (Layard et al., 1991). 
There are several possible xplanations for the existence of holdouts. A holdout may be a 
form of industrial action if it is a close substitute for a strike. Then, a holdout may be 
considered as a means for unions to collect information about the profitability of firms. A 
holdout is thus a mechanism that allows workers to extract higher wages from more profitable 
employers. An early model of industrial disputes is Hicks' theory of strikes which first 
appeared in Hicks (1932). Modern analysis of strike activity started with Ashenfelter and 
Johnson (1969). A key prediction of the strike literature is that negotiated wages and strike 
durations are negatively correlated (Card, 1990, indicates that in empirical studies this 
negative relationship is not always found). If that were the case, then negotiated wage 
increases and holdouts would also be negatively correlated. 
However, holdouts may also be determined by specific bargaining agendas. In the Dutch 
setting of industrial relations, wage formation is a time-consuming process. Negotiation spells 
may be long due to mutual and internal coordination. Draft agreements need to be discussed 
among union members and between union negotiators and their management. Bargaining 
issues may be so complex in the juridical sense that they take considerable time to draft the 
final text. Also, since new agreements are commonly backdated to the date at which the 
former contract elapsed, there is little pressure to shorten holdouts. The variation between 
holdouts in different collective bargains would then be explained by the bargaining agenda. 
For instance, those agreements that need to be struck for longer (two-year) periods, or those 
with many technical details, take longer than those for one:year contracts with a simpler 
agenda. If holdouts are lengthy because of such procedures, then they should not be given 
much attention from an economic point of view. They can last long because they have no 
serious consequences. 
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3. Data 
We have information about holdouts and wage increases for wage settlements gathered from 
administrative files of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. Our data are on 
individual collective agreements of seven industries and eight firms, which are at the industry 
level (1979 numbers of employees who are covered by c~llective agreements in parentheses): 
Metal industry (250,000); Cigar industry (3,400); Printing industry (41,000); Manufacture of 
dairy products (21,000); Breweries (1,200); Manufacture of printing ink (2,600) and Insurance 
(35,000). At the firm level we have: Philips (65,000); Unilever (9,600); Douwe Egberts 
(3,500); Heineken (4,700); Akzo (5,000); Chemiefarma (550); AMEV (2,450) and DSM 
(13,000). 
The 15 bargaining pairs give us 150 data points in a balanced panel dataset covering the 
period 1975-1987, with no observations for the years 1976, 1981 and 1984. For the year 1976 
this is due to government interference, when the government decided that changes in on-going 
contracts were not allowed. In 1981 and 1984 there where no negotiations because of the 
evolving biannual agreements in 1980 and 1983. The low strike activity in The Netherlands i
reflected in our sample. In none of the firms and industries was there a strike in the period of 
analysis. 
The situation in the labour market in the 1970s differed from the one in the 1980s. As in 
many other European countries economic conditions in The Netherlands deteriorated 
dramatically in the early 1980s. The average unemployment rate in the 1970s was 4.5%, while 
it was 13.9% in the period 1980-1987. There are also remarkable differences between the 
average holdouts and wage increases in the 1970s and those in the 1980s. As indicated in Table 
1, in the 1970s holdouts lasted 5-7 months, whereas in the 1980s this was 8-10 months. 
Holdouts are relatively long compared with the United States. Cramton and Tracy (1992), 
who define a holdout as the time between the expiration of the former contract and the time 
of a principle agreement, find an average holdout of about 1 month. Our definition of a 
Table 1 
Holdouts, average initial wage increases and wage cost increases in The Netherlands (standard eviatiom) ~
Initial Wage cost 
Holdout wage increase increase 
(months) (% i year) (%/year) 
1975 5.9 (3.7) 2.6 (1.8) 10.2 (3.6) 
1977 6.1 (3.6) 1.8(0.5) 9.7 (1.4) 
1978 6.8(3.7) 0.6(0.5) 5 1(19) 
1979 7.4 (4.0) 0.3 (0.5) 5.7 (2.8) 
1980 10.4 (4.3) 1.2 (0.7) 2.6 (1.4) 
!989 g.3 ¢~ g~ n h _ , , . , , j  ~,., ( l . i )  5 .9  (8 .5 )  
1983 9.7 (5.4) 0.1 (0.2) 3.0 (3.5) 
1985 8.3 (3.5) 1.1 (0.8) 4.2 (2.5) 
1986 9.0(3.6) 0.9(0.8) 3.3(2.4) 
1987 8.6(3.1) 1.0(0.7) 2.3(1.3) 
a Based on the 15 bargaining pairs mentioned in the paper. 
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holdout not only covers the negotiation period but also the time-consuming period between 
the time of a principle agreement and the moment of registration at the government office. 
This period in which the final text is drafted and the contract is signed averages 2-3 months. 
From Table 1 it also appears that wage increases in the 1980s were smaller than those in the 
I970s. We use two indicators of wage increase. The first indicator is the initial contract wage 
increase, which is equivalent to the real wage increase per worker. The second indicator is the 
wage cost increase, which includes the initial contract wage increase, the price indexation of 
the wage and wage costs due to, for example, an increased number of holidays and reduced 
num0er of working hours. 
4. Empirical anaiy~is 
Wage increases may be determined by changing macroeconomic conditions like unemploy- 
ment and economic growth. Furthermore, they may be determined by bargaining-pair-specific 
circumstances which do not change over time. To represent the first type of effects we use 
calendar-time-specific dummies; for the second type of effects we use bargaining-pair-specific 
dummies. 
We use a simple linear specification of the wage growth equation: 
w~.,-/30 +/31~ •d~ +/~, .  d, +/33. s~., + ~%, 
where w denotes the annual wage increase (%), s the holdout (months) and the d's represent 
dummy variables. Furthermore, i is a subscript for bargaining pair (1 , . . . ,  15) and t a 
subscript for bargaining year (1 , . . . ,  10), while u~,, is the disturbance t rm. In this equation 
the/3 a's represent bargaining-pair fixed effects and the/3,'s the calendar-time fixed effects. The 
equation is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
The estimation results are shown in Table 2. It appears that at conventional levels of 
significance holdouts have a negative ffect on the initial wage increases. The estimation 
results with or without bargaining-pair fixed effects are almost he same, indicating that there 
are hardly any differences in wage increases between bargainingpairs. After introducing 
calendar-time fixed effects in model 3 the explanatory power of the model increases, which 
indicates that macroeconomic determinants have an important effect on wage increases at the 
level of individual bargaining units. 
The introduction of calendar-time fixed effects in model 3 causes the coefficient on hol0outs 
to decrease. Nevertheless, the coefficient is still significantly smaller than zero at conventiunal 
levels of significance. Adding bargaining-pair fixed effects t¢~ the equation with calendar-time 
t~ed effects in model 4 does not improve the estimatica results. From F-test statistics 
presented in Table 2 it also appears that calendar-time fixed effects are relevant while 
bargaining-pair f xed effects are not. Using our preferred model 3, we conclude that the 
holdout effect is rather small: a holdout of 2 months lowers wage increases by 0.1%. 
To account for possible ndogeneity of the holdouts, model 3 with time-dependent fixed 
effects is also estimated using two-stage least squares with lagged holdouts, lagged wage 
increase and the calendar-time dummies as instruments. It appears from Table 2 that the 
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Table 2 
Estimation results; coefficient on holdouts (standard errors)" 
Initial wage R 2 Wage cost R2 
OLS 
1. No fixed effects 
2. Bargaining-pair fixed effects 
3. Calendar-time fixed effects 
4. Both types of fixed effects 
-0.07i (0.019) 0.08 -0.31 (0.07) 0.13 
-0.089 (0.024) 0.04 -0.36 (0.08) 0.10 
-0.O47 (0.016) 0.45 -0.13 (0.O5) 0.55 
-0.055 (0.020) 0.43 -0.10 (0.06) 0.56 
TSLS 
5. Calendar-time fixed effects -0.069 (0.036) 0.44 -0.42 (0.13) 0.44 
F-test statistic, models 3 and 4 b 
F-test statistic, models 2-4 c 
0.74 1.28 
11.59 16.94 
"The R 2 is corrected for degrees of freedom; all OLS estimates are based on 150 &,ta points; the TSLS estimate 
is based on 149 data points since f~or one of the bargaining pairs information before 1975 is missing. 
b At 5% level critical value F(14, 126)= 1.77. 
At 5% level critical value F(9, 126) = 1.95. 
estimated coefficient of the holdout does not change a lot, so the estimation results are quite 
robust. 
We also estimated the effect of holdouts on wage-cost increases, finding similar resulted. 
Here, too, the bargaining-pai~' fixed effects have no significant effect on the wage-co:;t 
increase. In all estimates holdouts have a negative effect on wage-cost increases. The holdout 
coefficient for the wage-cost increase- in absolute terms- is larger than that of the initial 
wage increase. A holdout of 2 months lowers wage-cost increase by 0.2%. This indicates that 
holdouts not only have a negative effect on the initial wage increase but also on the other parts 
of the wage costs. 
$. Conclusions 
In the empirical analysis we find small but significant effects of holdouts on wage increases. 
It is clear that holdouts are more than a random number determined by the length of 
administrative procedures. Probably, to some extent holdouts are substitutes for strikes. 
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